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Status and Contracts in Industrial Relations. La Refondation 
sociale, a new Bottle for an old (French) Wine? ** 
Since 1999, the main French employers organisation (Medef) has been promoting a radical 
transformation of the institutional framework of industrial relations and the welfare state. This initia-
tive, known as the Social Re-foundation agenda, has started to be implemented through a new cycle 
of inter-sectoral negotiations with the unions, on major issues such as the reform of the social security 
and unemployment insurance schemes: the ways and means for the development of collective 
bargaining, etc. Echoing the trends observed in many national industrial relations systems in Europe 
and also at the UE level, the Social Re-foundation represents the most ambitious attempt ever made 
in France at redefining the boundaries between legal and contractual rules in the regulation of em-
ployment relations. In order to assess the issues at stake with the Social Re-foundation, the paper 
first provides a brief historical overview of the French industrial relations institutions, focusing on the 
shameful corporatist mechanisms through which labour and capital were authorised to apply, spell 
out, in some cases also modify state regulations in this field. Then the authors question the assump-
tions and the motives of the social re-founders when they claim to promote the collective auton-
omy of social partners against state law, by showing how their dualistic conception of law and con-
tract is not in accordance with the complex institutional reality. Finally, it is suggested that the main 
aim of the Medefs strategy is to favour contractual autonomy at the lowest levels of collective bar-
gaining, so as to develop firms self-regulation. This would also mean a return to the individualist 
contractual philosophy of civil law, i.e the very opposite conception on which labour law and indus-
trial relations institutions have been built up since the late 19th century. 
Vertrag und Gesetz in den industriellen Beziehungen. Die refondation sociale  ein alter 
(französischer) Wein in neuen Schläuchen? 
Seit 1999 betreibt der französische Arbeitgeberverband (Medef) eine radikale Umwandlung des insti-
tutionellen Rahmens der industriellen Beziehungen und des Wohlfahrtsstaats. Diese Initiative wird als so-
ziale Neugründung bezeichnet. Um die Bedeutung dieses Vorgangs würdigen zu können, wird in dem Pa-
pier zunächst ein kurzer historischer Überblick über die Institutionen der industriellen Beziehungen in 
Frankreich gegeben. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dabei den schändlichen korporatistischen Mecha-
nismen geschenkt, die Arbeit und Kapital die Aufgabe übertragen, staatliche Normen in diesem Bereich an-
zuwenden, zu konkretisieren oder in definierten Fällen auch zu modifizieren. Die Autoren hinterfragen an-
schließend die Annahmen und Motive hinter dem Anspruch der sozialen Neugründer, die kollektive Au-
tonomie der Sozialpartner gegenüber staatlichen Gesetzen zu stärken, indem sie zeigen, dass die dichoto-
mische Konzeption von Gesetz und Vertrag nicht mit der komplexen institutionellen Wirklichkeit überein-
stimmt. Abschließend wird die Annahme begründet, dass das wichtigste von Medef angestrebte Ziel in der 
Förderung der Vertragsfreiheit auf der untersten, der betrieblichen Ebene der industriellen Beziehungen 
besteht, um die dezentralen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der Unternehmen zu erweitern. Dies würde allerdings 
eine Rückkehr zum individualistischen Begriff des Einzelvertrags im bürgerlichen Recht als Basis der  
industriellen Beziehungen implizieren, also zum Gegenteil dessen, worauf Arbeitsrecht und industrielle  
Beziehungen seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert aufgebaut wurden. 
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Introduction 
In November 1999, after yet another conflict with the government over the im-
plementation of the 35-hour working week, the main French employers organisation 
(Medef) invited the five trade-union confederations (see insert 1) to discuss the es-
tablishment of a new social constitution
1
. All social partners agreed on an 
agenda for inter-sectoral negotiations on major issues such as the reform of the social 
security and unemployment insurance schemes, the ways and means for the devel-
opment of collective bargaining and the overhaul of the vocational training system. 
Beyond the issues specific to each particular topic, this global initiative  known as 
the Refondation Sociale, i.e., social re-foundation  is the most ambitious attempt 
ever made in France at reinforcing the regulatory function of rules stemming from 
collective bargaining between labour and capital representatives vis-à-vis the State 
and its legislation. While France, more than any other European country, is charac-
terised by the considerable importance of state law in industrial relations regula-
tions, the social re-foundation has given birth to a wide debate on the boundaries 
between the respective jurisdictions of the social partners and the government. These 
questions even took an important space in the 2002 presidential candidates electoral 
programmes. Adopting the employers organisations analysis, the new right-wing 
government (elected in June 2002) announced its intention of freeing collective 
bargaining from its legislative straightjacket by giving greater autonomy to the so-
cial partners.  
This issue has not only arisen in France. In several European countries, such as 
Italy, Netherlands, Germany, or Spain, recent reforms or governmental projects aim-
ing at reforming the principles of collective bargaining and unions representative-
ness has raised the same debates about the extent and content of social partners 
collective autonomy. At the EU level, these questions have arisen in a very salient 
way ever since the Maastricht Social Protocol, which was subsequently incorporated 
into the Amsterdam Treaty (Articles 137 to 139). Indeed, the EU Treaty now in-
cludes a compulsory procedure for consultation of the European social partners be-
fore the Commission presents any proposals in the social policy field. If the social 
partners decide to begin negotiations on the subject in question and if a collective 
agreement is signed, it can at the joint request of the signatories be incorporated in a 
Council decision, on a proposal from the Commission
2
.
Significantly, this joint production of European law, in which many observers 
have seen the basis of an Euro-corporatism, is considered as an example to be fol-
 
1
We would like to thank George Ross (Harvard University, United States), as well as the 
referees, for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
2
It was on this basis that the first negotiations took place, and agreements were signed on 
parental leave (1995), part-time work (1997) and fixed-term contracts (1999) and 
subsequently implemented as directives.  
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lowed by the French social partners engaged in the social re-foundation. More 
generally, there is, amongst French social and political leaders, a very widespread 
feeling that employment relations in France are behind the times when compared to 
other European countries. On the Medefs side, the rhetoric of the adaptation of 
French industrial relations to the competitive international environment is central to 
the discourse advocating the necessity of the reforms. Convinced of the virtues of 
economic liberalism, the originators of the social re-foundation consider that the 
ingredients of a national competitive economy are well-known and firmly demon-
strated by what they observe abroad and the indisputable analysis of international 
organizations such as the OECD. One of the first goals to attain is to eradicate so-
cial rigidities, by deregulating the labor market and promoting a more decentralized 
collective bargaining system, where the general rules of labour law could be adapted 
to the specific situation of each firm.  
The trend towards the decentralization of industrial relations systems is com-
mon to many European countries. It is particularly perceptible in neo-corporatist 
countries, such as Sweden or Germany, where opening clauses (Öffnungsklauseln)
have been widely introduced into branch-level agreements, allowing firms to diverge 
from collectively agreed standards. F. Traxler, S. Blaschke and B. Kittel (2001) have 
shown that these metamorphoses of labour relations do not add up to a convergence 
between national models or a general deregulation of employment relations. 
Nevertheless, over the last few decades, all national industrial relations systems in 
Europe have been characterized by an increased inter-dependence between employ-
ment legislation, employment policies and collective bargaining and the trend has 
been for regulation to be increasingly delegated to the social partners at EU, national 
and firm levels.  
This conjunction between the decentralisation of collective bargaining and the 
increasing autonomy of the social partners has deeply affected, albeit to varying de-
grees, the former equilibrium reached under the Fordist-Keynesian era between rules 
emanating from contractual relations engaged by labour and capital on one hand, and 
legally prescribed rights and obligations on the other (Streeck 1998). Indeed, the 
general trend towards contractualisation that has spread to all areas of social activ-
ity (Supiot 2001b) produces very strong disruptive effects in the field of employment 
relations, as their regulation is founded upon a series of rules and social institutions 
which ensure that the employer-employee relationship is not primarily determined 
by market forces (Hyman 2000: 1). This function is fulfilled essentially by the defi-
nition of equilibrium between what individuals can exchange through their employ-
ment contract and an intangible basis of statutory rights that individuals possess as 
members of a social group independently of individual agreements, which they can-
not negotiate away by contract (Streeck 1992: 51). 
The current attempt to reform the French industrial relations system offers a 
very rich field from which to analyse this great transformation in the ways status 
and contracts are articulated in the regulation of employment relations. If the case is 
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so exemplary for our research purpose, this is partly because of the unbounded ambi-
tion of the social re-founders, who explicitly aim at redefining the respective roles 
of the market and social institutions in taking responsibility for the risks inherent in 
the development of post-industrial societies (Kessler 1999; Kessler/Ewald 2000)3.
But it is also and mainly because of the peculiarities of the long and conflictual 
French social history. In France, the current trends towards a greater autonomy of 
contractual norms from rules of status proceeds from a general reluctance  shared 
by the State, trade unions and employers associations, for different reasons to which 
we will soon come back  to recognize the complexity of French industrial relations 
institutions. Within these are linked and coexisting autonomous regulations (col-
lective agreements and bodies which emanate from it) and heterenomous ones pro-
duced by public authorities. Due to the fundamental jacobinist nature of the national 
political culture, the very relative contractual autonomy of social partners became 
a tangible principle only through a constant hybridisation of statutory and contractual 
features. This insured, on the one hand, the participation of individual interests in the 
construction of the general interest, and this, in the absence of a legitimising neo-
corporatist doctrine. On the other hand, it also allowed for the necessary counter-
balancing between the different actors involved in industrial relations, a necessity 
due to the subordinate position of labour in a capitalist economy.  
The first part of this paper will examine these aspects by first giving a brief his-
torical overview on how labour and capital were authorised to supply State interven-
tion in the regulation of employment relations. Then, we shall explain why the col-
lective agreement and the main institutional manifestation of collective bargaining  
the jointly managed bodies which define the field of the so-called parity doctrine  
can be considered as a neo-corporatist mediation between the State and civil society 
(even if this remains unacknowledged in the French context). This is precisely the 
reason why, according to us, the social re-founders promote a fallacious and an-
tagonistic conception of the relations between the political domains and an idealised 
autonomous social sphere. Medefs initiative is also in keeping with the employ-
ers general strategy since the mid 1980s that aims at emancipating the firm in its 
function of regulating employment relations. Given the well-known weakness of the 
French trade unions (in terms of membership and cohesion), contractual autonomy at 
the lower levels of collective bargaining should easily lead to a self-regulation of 
firms. As we shall see in the second part of the paper, by examining the positions of 
trade unions and of the state on the controversial social re-foundation, all actors do 
not share the same vision of the dangers and opportunities created by this change. 
 
3
It is significant that the originators of the social re-foundation were two specialists (univer-
sity academics) of risk management: D. Kessler, economist, is Medefs vice-president and one 
of the directors of the Fédération Française des Sociétés dAssurances ; F. Ewald, now re-
search and strategy director in the same federation, was also assistant to M. Foucault at the 
Collège de France, studying the origins of the Welfare State. 
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Finally, we suggest that the real issue for the reform of industrial relations should to 
be the invention of new procedures that allow for the articulation of status and con-
tracts aimed at maintaining a socially regulated labour market. What we observe 
from Medefs strategy is a long way far from this. Ignoring the social embeddeness 
of contracts and the need for a third party in any contractual relations, its ideology 
refers less to the contract as it has been constructed by labour law since the late 19
th
 
century, and much more to an individualist philosophy of civil Law. 
Insert 1: A brief overview of the French trade unions and employers associations   
(Sources: Eironline; Jobert/Goetschy 2002) 
Union density has traditionally been low in France. It was around 23 per cent in the mid-1970s, fell 
to about 16% by 1985, then declined to around 9% by the mid-1990s. Moreover, pluralism, if not 
division, is a fundamental feature of French trade unionism. Five confederations (or national and 
multi-industry trade union organizations) have been recognized as representative at national level 
(see below). These are the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), the Confédération générale du 
travail-Force ouvrière (CGT-FO), the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC), 
the Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) and the Confédération française de 
lencadrement-confédération générale des cadres (CFE-CGC). 
The CGT, the oldest French confederation, was established in 1895, but has faced severe internal 
dissensions throughout its history. The most noteworthy occurred in 1948 when the non-communist 
minority established the current CGT-FO. The strong links between the CGT and the Communist 
Party have been slowly relaxed since the end of the cold war. In 1999, the CGT strategy marked a 
clear turning point toward a modernized approach seeking to articulate industrial action, dialogue, 
negotiation and a trade unionism of proposal-making. Between 1976 and 1990, the CGT lost two 
thirds of its members, with a total membership of 600,000 by the end of the 1990s, behind the 
CFDT with its claimed 730,000 members. In December 2002, at the last elections of 
prudhommes councillors (joint industrial tribunals), which are used in France as a de facto gauge 
of the influence of the various unions in the private sector, the CGT still ranked first, with 32,1% of 
the voters. 
Established in 1948, the CGT-FO claims to be the true heir of the CGTs traditional policy of 
political independence. Its membership is estimated to be close to 300,000 members. Its « doctrine » 
emphasises the defence of workers job interests, independently of any political party, promotes 
collective bargaining and the unions role in representing the interests of workers. Since the election 
of Marc Blondel as general secretary in 1989, the CGT-FO has adopted a more radical strategy (for 
example in 1995 against the « Juppé Plan » reforming the Social security system), in which many 
observers see the growing influence of a small minority of trotskyst activists at the head of the 
confederation. The CGT-FO ranked third at the 2002 industrial tribunal elections, with 18,3% of the 
voters. 
The CFTC (Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens) was formed in 1919, with the 
objective of promoting a peaceful collaboration between capital and labour, according to the social 
doctrine of the Catholic Church. The CFTC split in 1964, when the minority group retained the 
religious orientation and kept the name CFTC. It emphasizes the development of contractual 
relations, the rejection of the politization of unions and the defence of the family. CFTC total 
membership is around 80,000, and it obtained 9,7% of the votes at the last industrial tribunal 
elections. 
Following the CFTCs 1964 split, the majority group formally abandoned the social-catholic doc-
trine and formed the CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du travail). After having 
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adopted elements of a far-left ideology and promoted direct workers control on production in the 
aftermath of May 1968, the CFDT engaged a doctrinal revision in 1979 and began to emphasise un-
ion adaptation to economic change. This back-to-the-centre strategy (recentrage) entailed construc-
tive dialogue with government and employers and the promotion of the various features of social 
democracy. This « reformist » strategy was successful in terms of unionisation  mainly amongst 
white collar workers and managerial staff  but also created a lot of internal factional conflicts in 
the 1990s. Amongst the 5 major trade unions confederations, the CFDT occupies the first place in 
terms of membership and the second place in terms of electoral audience (25,2% in 2002) 
The CFE-CGC (Confédération française de lencadrement-Confédération générale des cadres-) 
was originally formed in 1946 and then known simply as the CGC. It is the only one of the five 
confederations possessing recognized representative status at national level which is intended for a 
single occupational category (management staff), whose definition is in any case uncertain. Its 
declining membership reach 80,000 by the end of the 1990s. The CFE-CGC won 7% of the votes at 
the last industrial tribunal elections. 
These five confederations are reputed to have an « indisputable presumption of representativeness » 
at national level. This legal status attributes to each union some exclusive rights, such as the 
nomination of candidates in the system of employee representation within the firm, in terms of 
representation on numerous governmental and other consultative bodies, but also open up public 
funding and empowers them to negotiate on behalf of larger groups of workers than their actual 
members. 
Founded in 1993 by independent public sector trade unions, the UNSA (Union Nationale des 
Syndicats Autonomes) has not yet been recognized as representative at national level. Despite its 
efforts to extend its recruitment and union organisation into the private sector, 80% of UNSAs 
claimed 360,000 members is still comprised of public sector employees. UNSA made a 
breakthrough into the private sector at the 2002 industrial tribunal elections (winning 5% of the 
vote). Besides these confederations, a looser gathering of unions called the group of ten was 
formed in 1981, carrying a radical « class struggle » doctrine. It includes 18 unions and 80,000 
members, while its two major union affiliates are the tax collectors (SNUI) and post and 
telecommunication workers (SUD-PTT) unions. The SUD grouping (post, railway, banks and 
education) has gathered ex-members of the CFDT (who left the CFDT in 1989 and 1996). Some of 
the unions among the group of ten are considered representative in their respective sectors. 
By contrast with the plurality of trade unionism, at a national level the employers are more united in 
their main confederation, the MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), formerly Conseil 
national du patronat français (CNPF). The CNPF was established in 1945, though employers had 
already been organised in a range of industry-level federations since the early nineteenth century, 
and at national level from 1919 onwards in a forerunner to the CNPF. The MEDEF includes more 
than three-quarters of all French enterprises, but conflicts between the major sectoral federations 
and the heterogeneity of its members interest makes collective action often difficult, except when it 
focuses on the alleviation of tax and social contributions. Having to face a socialist government for 
much of the time since 1981, the CNPF has adopted a policy of conflictual cooperation with the 
government, rather than one of ideological confrontation. The election of Mr Seillière in 1997 
inaugurated much more conflictual relationships both with the government and with the unions. 
These are also largely due to the MEDEFs fierce opposition to the law on the 35-hour week. 
The Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises or CGPME (Confédération générale 
des petites et moyennes entreprises) is a rival employers organisation, which nevertheless has 
common roots with the CNPF and often cooperates with it. Founded in 1944, it aims to bring to-
gether true employers in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)  the real employers  
rather than managers. It comprises 400 sectoral and intersectoral federations, to which are affiliated 
more than 3,500 organisations, both sector-based and local. Facing deep internal management prob-
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lems since 2000, the CGPME has great difficulty finding a place for itself in the world of employ-
ers representation in the wake of the 1998 transformation of the National CNPF into the MEDEF. 
The third employer organisations representative at national level is the UPA (Union professionnelle 
artisanale). It accounts for about 250 000 very small enterprises with 2 million employees and has 
taken several initiatives in the recent years to promote social dialogue in SME.   
The historical foundations of political regulations through intermediary 
bodies: a practice devoid of doctrine?  
Influenced by a Rousseauist vision of the State as one which has a monopoly 
over the production of the general interest, French political culture has never encour-
aged the creation of an autonomous space of industrial relations independent of the 
political sphere. The persistence of the revolutionary ideal of a general interest, 
based on the Nations quasi-mystical notion of sovereignty, is often identified as the 
root of a French impossibility to see the general interest as a compromise between 
individual interests, as in the Anglo-Saxon model (Rosanvallon 1988:180). Indeed, 
if the functional necessity of collective regulation of industrial relations has encour-
aged the development of actors and institutions, the absence of doctrinal foundation 
has made it overly fragile.  
 Corporatist ambiguity 
The historiography of French politics has often stressed that since the French 
revolution the construction of the State has taken place along the the lines of an uto-
pian project aimed at the creation of society by the State: This State () cannot 
simply think of managing procedures and rules or of having corrective and compen-
sating actions as in the case of an Etat de droit. Rather, it thinks fundamentally of it-
self as a social actor and not as a judge or as a referee. The idea that there can be an 
autonomous and self-sufficient civil society is actually foreign to this State (Rosan-
vallon 1990: 125).  
However, from the end of the 19
th
 century, the abstract metaphysical notion of a 
general interest has had to deal, with the difficulties of accommodating the formal 
rights of citizenship with the concrete situation of workers in a capitalist liberal 
economy. This is the context in which the social issue (question sociale) seems to 
threaten French society and in which the legal recognition of unions emerges with 
the law of March 21, 1884. This was seen both as a means to channel workers de-
mands and as a remedy to the atomisation of society, and this by compensating for 
individualist democracys weaknesses with an organic representation of interests. 
Nevertheless, this legal ratification did not solve the problem of unions and their 
place in the republican power structures. Some observers thought this was simply a 
transition phase preceding the creation of corporatist structures that would associate 
all producers. The celebration of the corporatist organisations virtues did not only 
include nostalgic proponents of the Old Regime. E. Durkheim himself became a pro-
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ponent of a renewed corporatist regime and was involved in the emergence of the 
reformed corporatist doctrine whose influence was felt until the 1930s (Le Crom 
1995; Rumillat 1988). 
One must note that the role E. Durkheim intended for occupational associations 
went well beyond the social field: it applied to the whole political system as well 
(Didry 2000; Gautier 1994; Supiot 1987). Organised along the corporatist model, oc-
cupational associations were seen as a necessary condition for individual emancipa-
tion (Durkheim 1995). For the founder of French sociology, these groups offered 
several advantages. They created a collective moral basis that could, on its own, pro-
tect individuals against the anomie, which tends to increase with the development of 
industrial societies. These intermediary bodies were seen as necessary to prevent the 
State from being oppressive against individuals as well as the States independence 
from the individual. In other words, they offered to the collective interest the means 
to distance itself from individual interests. The occupational association is indeed a 
place of socialisation that participates in a process of extension of individual inter-
est to the common good: collectively, its members create more general views (and at 
the same time, they create rules) that represent less directly their own interest (Gau-
tier 1994: 854).  
Occupational associations were thus intented to find a role to play in the mor-
alisation of economic life and determine the rights and duties of economic agents in 
different industries. One could, however, imagine the State (a social brain accord-
ing to E. Durkheim) fulfilling these functions. But for E. Durkheim, the State was a 
sociological monstrosity as well, because it was so distant from individual interests 
that it could not take all of them into account. Consequently, its interventions created 
new problems. Thus, political regulation and moralisation could only be the result of 
interested groups.  
Fundamentally, what we find here is a justification for social democracy. But, as 
A. Supiot (1987) pointed out, the problem for E. Durkheim was in his choice of 
words. Indeed, occupational association is the translation of the French expression: 
corporation de métier. Nowadays, the notion of corporatism refers to the excessive 
privileges of professions and to the Vichy regime. The term corporatist is even 
banned from the French political vocabulary and this rejection is also a reason for the 
cautious attention paid by political science to neo-corporatist theories. Even with this 
unfortunate choice of words, however, E. Durkheims theory of the occupational as-
sociations remains a fruitful way to explain the strength of political imperatives in 
the history of the institutionalisation of industrial relations in France. At the very 
least, it can account for the permanent tensions between the metaphysical princi-
ples of Jacobine culture and the States pragmatic concerns to improve the efficiency 
and legitimacy of its policies, by relying on the mediation capacities of Labour and 
Capitals organised interests. 
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The collective agreement: a hybrid between law and contract 
The historical development of collective bargaining in France has always been 
closely related to the need for the State to ensure social peace
4
. Even though collec-
tive agreements are theoretically limited to a precise object  i.e., the definition of 
rights and obligations of those involved in the employment relation, their normative 
effect goes well beyond this. As such, collective agreements, which are neither pure 
contract nor law, constitute a means for achieving more efficient and legitimate so-
cial governance. 
If law is voted by elected representatives, it remains external to those to whom 
it is applied and who often submit to it more than they actually accept it. On the con-
trary, the purpose of collective agreement is to enable social partners to develop and 
make contracts over their own solutions. This starts from the assumption that the ef-
ficiency and the legitimacy of norms are greatest when those interested in the issue 
are involved in their elaboration. In so doing, public authorities turn to unions as or-
gans of social democracy in important ways (Despax 2000). This would not be the 
case if collective agreements were only bound the members of the signatory organi-
sations. But in France, as in many European countries, the legal provisions regarding 
union representativeness and the extension of collective agreements have progres-
sively meant that agreements can stipulate compulsory applicable dispositions for all 
firms falling under its application field
5
.
These provisions give signatory members a normative power that goes well be-
yond the restricted private contractual relations, and thus contribute to blurring the 
traditional dichotomy between on the one hand the law which is deliberate and uni-
lateral, reflecting the general interest, and on the other hand the contract, which is 
negotiated, bilateral and reflects individual interests (Supiot 2001b: 9). A collective 
agreement thus borrows both from the contract (its form) and from the law (its heter-
onormativity). In other words, it has the body of a contract but the spirit of law as 
Cornelutti, an Italian jurist, put it (quoted in Despax 2000).  
If the collective agreement, as A. Supiot named it, is a « hybrid » of law and 
contract, whose development was encouraged by the welfare state as an alternative 
 
4
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, collective bargaining mostly aimed at ending strikes 
involving important conflicts and leading to specific agreements. This led to an evolution of 
rules whose major steps were the laws of 1919, 1936, 1950 and 1971. 
5
France is peculiar in having the lowest unions density amongst European countries, but one 
of the highest rates of collective bargaining coverage. This is due to the « extension » proce-
dure, a technique whereby the Minister of labour makes a collective agreement generally bind-
ing within its occupational and territorial scope. The conditions to which it is subject and the 
procedure which must be followed (consultation of the social partners seating at the National 
Collective Bargaining Commission) are specified by law in considerable detail (Source : 
EMIRE, Eiro). 
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or as a complement to legislative action, the process of hybridisation eventually was 
taken a step further with the procedure of negotiated law that appeared in France in 
the 1970s, particularly in the field of vocational training (Verdier/Langlois 1972; 
Mériaux 1999). In this case, social partners are invited by the State to negotiate, at 
the inter-sectoral level, an agreement whose provisions are to be subsequently en-
forced by law. Nothing obliges the State to proceed in this manner, except for the 
shared conviction that negotiated solutions will be better adapted than those arising 
from the legislator. ; This delegation of legislative competence to the social part-
ners was the precursor to the neo-modern law of public policy already in place in 
other spheres (Morand 1999). Even more than a collective agreement, a negotiated 
law constitutes a corporatist contractualisation in law production (Morand 1991: 
218), which deeply shakes the ordering of normative sources. It must be emphasised 
here that, unlike in the German situation where collective autonomy is a constitu-
tional right, French public law does not have a judicial foundation for this type of 
procedure. Rather, the negotiated law mechanism comes from tradition and has 
never been consolidated judicially. Thus, devoid of any external guarantee, its per-
petuation depends on the good will and the mutually understood interest of all signa-
tory members. This implies that negotiated law in France does not benefit from the 
stability and the routines so characteristic of the neo-corporatist mechanisms existing 
in other European countries
6
.
Paritarisme as corporatist-style mediation between state and society  
As a social regulation procedure, collective bargaining and the legal representa-
tiveness status on which it rests constitute the means by which democracy within 
democracy is organised (Borenfreund 1991: 687). But this is not the only means by 
which industrial relations actors have been allowed to counterbalance the socio-
logical deficit at the root of the French political model (Rosanvallon 1998: 257). 
The development of a consultative administration (Hauriou 1907) at the end of the 
19
th
 century, with the creation of multiple superior councils (work, agriculture, in-
dustry and commerce) in which we find representatives of groups involved or inter-
ested in policy-making, was an initial form of corporatist regulation that allowed for, 
 
6
In contemporary political theory, neo-corporatism does not signify corporatism in Durk-
heimian sense. As P. Schmitter first suggested, the neo or new corporatism can be defined as 
« a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally dif-
ferentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a delib-
erate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports » (1979: 
13). Despite the different definitions which have been proposed after P. Schmitters one (Wil-
liamson 1989), Nordic countries have very often been presented as the parangon of neo-
corporatism. 
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although this was never actually admitted, the implementation of new relations be-
tween State and society.  
After WWII, the generalisation of jointly managed bodies followed a very simi-
lar logic (Duclos/Mériaux 1997, 1998). Adopting the principle of management by 
interested parties, the State granted unions, employers and mutualists representa-
tives important prerogatives in the general Social security scheme, including seats on 
the managing boards of the various social security funds (pensions, family allow-
ances, health) at national and local levels. Parity doctrine then freed itself further 
from State control in the institutions set up by way of collective agreement to man-
age complementary pension schemes for management staff (1947) and for all wage-
earners (1961). It was mostly due to a State initiative that social partners enlarged 
this model of joint management to unemployment insurance in 1958. Since 1970, the 
parity doctrine has again been used to implement a continuing vocational training 
system, in which social partners are entitled by the State to manage training insur-
ance funds for collecting the compulsory payments which enterprises are required to 
make towards the general funding of further vocational training. 
Considering the vast field of paritarisme (between 20 000 and 30 000 members 
mandates in unions and employers organisations, and a budget greater than that 
managed by the State), it is undeniable that it has provided a major means for French 
unions, and to less extent the employers associations, to maintain political influence 
way beyond the strength of their membership and the finances necessary for their 
very functioning. Paradoxically, until recently, this cornerstone of the French indus-
trial relations system has remained relatively unrecognized by both social actors and 
observers. The explanation for this lies in the persistence of the corporatist taboo, 
which makes it difficult to emphasise how closely paritarisme is linked to the im-
peratives of political governability. However, it is clear that whatever their form 
(administration councils, technical committees, consultative commissions, etc.), their 
degree of autonomy relative to the State or the arithmetic formula structuring their 
make-up, these bodies are integrated into institutions that have a general interest 
mission or that implement a national public service. Within this institutional frame-
work, the representatives of particular interests are mandated to administrate general 
interest services. The social partners interpret and manage short-term demands 
arising from their rank-and-file so as to implement them according to a long-term in-
terest (Marin 1985). As this process channels the expression of particular interests 
and avoids the multiplication of demands by different groups on the State, it comes 
near in many ways to the type of action described and promoted by E. Durkheim in 
his corporatist model. 
Even with the risk of getting criticised by the very actors it legitimises, the State 
has reaped considerable advantages by playing the card of paritarisme, and indeed 
its intervention (or non-intervention) has always been decisive in the creation of 
these institutions. Relying upon the workers and employers organisations capacity 
to aggregate support and to produce compliance, the State has discovered a means to 
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increase its legitimacy and the efficiency of its policies. For the State, the develop-
ment of jointly managed institutions represents a way of ensuring that the behaviour 
of the social parties is both more compatible and predictable, even when the uncer-
tainties inherent in policy making are strong (Jobert/Muller 1987). 
However, and this is what makes the French case quite difficult to place in the 
usual corporatist typologies, the participation of intermediary bodies in political 
regulation has never been made explicit. Such a move would have required actors to 
accept to assume a counterpart role to the institutional resources and powers con-
ferred by the State. However, even if it is central to any kind of societal corporatism, 
the logic of political exchange (Pizzorno 1978) goes too much against the myth of 
a social power and of autonomous organisations, which French unions refuse to shed 
(with the CFDTs possible exception).  
An important idea arises out of this historical portrait: far from forming an 
autonomous whole, the French industrial system retains dependent relations with the 
State that are also multiple and dialectic. This configuration is the child of a shame-
ful corporatist heritage. Its peculiar characteristic is that workers and employers 
unions differ fundamentally from most other pressure groups in that they can, 
through collective agreement, decide for themselves the rules to be applied in a vast 
field (Reynaud 1989: 117). But despite the social partners belief that they can im-
plement and create laws on their own, their contractual autonomy is only relative. In 
French law making, collective autonomy does exist but it is tempered by its founda-
tions in law (Yannakourou 1995: 74).  
 Social Re-foundation: issues and position-taking. 
When we examine the historical roots and the operating logic of paritarisme 
and collective agreement, that are so central to French industrial relations, we 
quickly see how false the classical binary categorisations (law/contract, pub-
lic/private, general-individual interest) are. Indeed, reality is far more complex, in an 
institutional system within which hybrid forms of autonomous regulation (the collec-
tive agreement and the institutions arising from it) and external regulations by politi-
cal authorities are embedded. The contemporary debates on the social re-
foundation and the many implicit and continued ambiguities regarding the place 
taken by social partners in the socio-political regulation game is an illustration of the 
French specificity in this area (Duclos/Mériaux: 2001). 
 The meaning of the social re-foundation 
One wonders about Medefs objective when it invited workers unions, in No-
vember 1999, to discuss about a new social constitution (renamed afterwards so-
cial re-foundation). Officially over one million members strong, the most important 
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French employers association
7
criticised the current confusion between the issues 
concerning social partners and those concerning the State in the spheres of social 
protection and employment relations
8
. Indeed, adds the Medef,  it is the increasing, 
destabilising and unceasing State intervention that threatens the very existence of an 
autonomous social sphere (ibid.). Medef thus uses a two-track rhetoric. On the one 
hand, it talks of an autonomous social sphere within which social partners would 
define, through a social dialogue and freely negotiated agreements, the rules relat-
ing to work relations and to social protection. On the other, it argues for a sphere that 
would fall strictly under the States sole jurisdiction. 
Despite the much more complex institutional reality depicted above, the surpris-
ing part is that, Medef has succeeded in imposing its own lexicon and arguments on 
all parties involved in the controversy, i.e. trade unions and numerous politicians. 
The media coverage of the open conflict on the unemployment insurance reform, 
social re-foundations first target (see insert 2), certainly enhanced its public pro-
file. Its consequence was a heightened cleavage between the parties, two opposing 
camps thus appearing and continuing to face each other today. On one side were the 
supporters of the contractual approach, i.e. those who signed the June 2000 agree-
ment on unemployment insurance (the employers unions, the CFDT and the CFTC). 
The other side was formed of a social-republican alliance made up of non-signatory 
unions (CGT, FO, CGC) and the left-wing government, who all put forward the de-
fence of the public social order, and thereby the legislators primacy. However, look-
ing at this more closely, we can see, that these coalitions are far more heterogeneous 
than they seem. Among the partisans of contractual autonomy, the shared belief in 
the superiority of a freely negotiated law hides substantial differences.  
Insert 2:  The social re-foundations labours 
1. Unemployment insurance.  
Signed on June 14
th,
 2000, this was the first agreement arising from the social re-foundation 
initiative. This agreement, signed by the CFDT and the CFTC, abandons the regressive nature 
of unemployment benefits and implements a back-to-work assistance plan (PARE) which made 
official a more personalised follow-up of beneficiaries. Ratified by small unions, this agree-
ment opened an important controversy with the government which then forced signatory parties 
to revise the agreements content several times. The government finally instituted the agree-
ment on December 6
th
, 2000. 
7
One should not forget the depth of structural divisions which continue to divide employers in 
different camps according to different values and interests: small-scale provincial employers 
are generally opposed to economic globalisation. They differ from the economic elite who are 
more mobile and have greater experience regarding the frictions between share-holders de-
mands and managers strategies. Obviously, Medefs rhetoric is far from corresponding to 
homogenous interests that would be recognised as such.  
8
Pour une nouvelle constitution sociale (For a new social constitution), text adopted by 
Medefs executive council, November 2
nd
, 1999. 
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2. Health at the workplace. 
An agreement on this issue was signed with the CGC, the CFTC and the CFDT. Medef gave up 
its project of transferring to city doctors the industrial medicine sphere. It also accepted to give 
greater importance to unions in watchdog institutions such as the INRS (the national institute 
for research and security). 
3. Complementary retirement plans. 
Started in December 2000, discussions on this theme have been conflictual. For Medef, the is-
sue is one of balancing the increasing number of retirements without increasing contributions. 
This is why it has suggested an increase in the duration of contributions which, implicitly, 
raises the question of the principle of retirement at 60 years old.  
4. Industrial Vocational Training.  
This issue also arose in December 2000. The problems associated with it are the improvement 
of the quality-cost relationship of industrial vocational training and of decreasing access ine-
qualities. Medef hopes employers will undergo training outside of working hours.  
5. Collective bargaining. 
This was at the heart of the social re-foundation approach. Medef presented a text on De-
cember 18
th
, 2000 that aimed at revising the founding principles of the French industrial rela-
tions system, especially those principles related to the articulation between law and contract. 
The issue of unions financing was also raised. Discussions concluded with a common text (July 
16
th
 2000) signed by employers and unions (with the exception of the CGT) demanding that it 
only applies to majority agreements.  
6. Health insurance:  
On November 21
 th
, 2001, MEDEF presented a proposal for reforming the social security sys-
tem that aimed at opening up the management of health insurance to private competition. 
Medef also proposed to unify the different retirement plans. A point system would replace the 
current one, based on the length of contributions. 
7. Other issues which have been delayed or for which negotiations have not been yet started in-
clude family allowances, the role of management and gender equality. 
The contract as an embodiment of modernity? 
In the battle for a social re-foundation, one finds the defence for contractual 
policies at the debates core. But what is its real significance? For Medef, a contrac-
tual autonomy that could be embodied in a renewed paritarisme has a direct and 
clear goal: it has to optimise social expenses in France because they represent an 
exorbitant amount9. But this optimisation (i.e., the decrease of contributions to so-
cial security funds) must focus on facilitating the restructuration of social protection 
along the line of a new risk government whose objective would be less to transfer 
to the State the risks citizens must take than it is to allow them to rely on institutions 
that do not take responsibility away from them (Ewald/Kessler 2000: 71). As far as 
industrial relations are concerned, Medef proposes to reverse the pyramid by trans-
forming firms, and even the establishment, into the systems enlarged base and to 
 
9
G. Jollès, Medefs president of the social protection GPA, quoted in La revue des entreprises,
Jan-Feb. 2000, n° 618 bis: 24. 
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give law its role of defining principles
10
. Subsidiarity takes on the primary role and 
law becomes a supplement to contract: contractual autonomy thus aims at reversing 
the hierarchy of norms, in which the law is at the top  symbolically at least  and 
where collective agreements at branch level set up the main part of the various obli-
gations incumbent on the parties to an employment contract. 
This perspective is much less revolutionary than it appears because it continues 
the trajectory of collective bargaining of the past two decades. It has shown most 
importantly an increasing freedom from the State but also the emancipation of the 
different negotiation levels from each other (Morin 2000: 81). Indeed, it has been a 
long time since the favour principle, stating that collective agreements can only be 
at least as favourable to workers as the legal provisions, was replaced by a more 
pragmatic conception of subsidiarity. Contray to demands for greater autonomy in 
the social protection field, Medefs discourse on collective bargaining does not rep-
resent a fundamental rupture with the well-entrenched tradition. But in both cases, 
the logic of efficiency must take precedence over the reinforcement and the re-
foundation of collective guarantees: adaptation to the new competitive world and 
the search for social and economic optimisation must guide the reform of rules and 
social institutions.  
The argument that the weakness of industrial relations regulations is the conse-
quence of insufficient collective bargaining autonomy is also taken up by some un-
ions, among which we find the CFDT. With the CFTC, the CFDT shares the same 
Christian-democrat ideological background. They are alone in claiming a corpora-
tist heritage, albeit by using a euphemistic language of intermediary institutions 
that have a role to play in the French democratic system. For N. Notat, the CFDTs 
general secretary until 2002, the State, looking for new forms of public regulations 
(), finds its interest in a civil society regulating itself through contracts and 
through intermediary institutions representing the different interests inherent to 
them (Notat, 2000). However, this position is not as simple as it seems. Contrary to 
the Medef, the CFDT does not propose to substitute law by contract wherever this is 
possible. Instead, N. Notat proposes the creation of a better articulation between 
contractual politics and the States production of rules and legislation (ibid). This 
gets more complicated still when we see that different points of views exist within 
the confederation11.
10
 Medef declaration at a joint meeting on the theme of Means and ends to strengthen collective 
bargaining, March 14
th
, 2000. 
11
 M. Caron, the organisations national secretary describes the situation: The issue is to take 
paritarisme towards a stable and productive work relation mechanism and collective contract 
that would be free from the State (2000: 13, our emphasis). 
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The compromise found with the Medef regarding the unemployment insurance 
issue12 confirms that the CFDT has not yet stabilised nor adjusted its internal doc-
trine. It becomes even more obvious when we compare Medefs and the CFDTs 
analyses of labour market regulations. The employers confederation gives priority to 
the firm, on which level it wants to optimise rule production and the degree of social 
protection, which are to be linked to the conditions of competition. As for the 
CFDTs position, the hope placed in a new industrial relations dynamic is linked to a 
commitment to build effective and adapted social guarantees. Behind the contrac-
tual philosophy both organisations display, one can thus find rather incompatible 
ambitions. But the communication strategy is not without effect: Medef is very con-
vincing in its argument that there is a convergence with the CFDT on fundamentals, 
while remaining rather evasive on the precise limits of the social public order it is 
willing to give up to the State. 
 The argument for the social-republican alliance 
One of the major effects of the media coverage of the social re-foundation de-
bate was to polarise positions radically. Against the all-contract approach proposed 
by Medef and the CFDT, the public authorities, the CGT and Force Ouvrière 
proposed an all-law approach, each still insisting on the States decisive role of 
third party in a dynamic where contractual autonomy can only exist within an area of 
heteronomy. Ms. Aubry, minister of Employment and Solidarity at the time when the 
social re-foundation project was launched, underlined that it is the laws responsi-
bility to delimit the general framework of the social public order. At the same time, 
she argued that social negotiations never occur between equal parties and that freely 
negotiated agreements do not erase inherent inequalities existing in the relationship 
between employers and employees13. Without ignoring the tactical aims of a minister 
engaged in a fierce battle with the Medef on the 35 hour working week, one must ac-
knowledge that this argument shows a very clear understanding of the French labour 
laws historical construction. This, indeed, is the very raison dêtre of labour law: 
the introduction of the principles of equality and freedom in a space of subordina-
tion, what A. Supiot (1994) has named civilising the firm (Supiot 1994). Based on 
such a rationale, the minister of Employment differentiates between the different reg-
isters in which laws and collective bargaining are embedded. While access to funda-
mental rights and the establishment of principles reflecting the general interest fall 
under the jurisdiction of the law, collective bargaining only has a functional legiti-
macy: it rests upon its capacity, recognised by policy-makers, to come up with solu-
 
12
 Carried along by its employers logic of contract-or-nothing the CFDT has contradicted its 
own principles when it signed a protocol (on unemployment insurance) containing a self-
destruct clause if the State refused to recognise the agreement in its totality.  
13
 Ms. Aubry, Minister of Employment and Solidarity, speech to the economic and social coun-
cil, March 14
th
 2000. 
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tions that optimise the exigencies linked to economic competition and those related 
to work conditions and employees lives (Aubry ibid.). Thus, laws and collective 
bargaining cannot be substituted for one another.  
As with governmental authorities, the CGT and Force Ouvrière criticise the ste-
rility and the dangers of a discourse based on a competitive vision of the relationship 
between law and contract. The CGT emphasises procedural conditions to a greater 
contractual autonomy and especially the revision of the union representativeness le-
gal regime. This should not be surprising. Whether one considers the functioning of 
parity bodies or of collective bargaining, the CGT has been the first victim of a sys-
tem that allows employers to govern parity institutions and to negotiate collective 
agreements by relying on minority unions. Force Ouvrières position is also interest-
ing as its argument relates directly to the issue of corporatism and the logical limits 
of contractualism. While recalling its historical attachment to contractual politics, 
Force Ouvrière refuses to put social partners in the position of legislator. On the one 
hand, contracts cannot do without laws as the right of contract parties is based on 
law and not on the right that these parties would give themselves14. On the other 
hand, the confederations leaders argue that a complete autonomy for contractual 
regulation would be incompatible with the republican system. For M. Blondel, Force 
Ouvrières general secretary, this would amount to putting power into the hands of 
the occupational associations members, to return to the Ancien Régime and purely 
and simply giving up the republican rule of law15.
The risks of contractual autonomy 
Beyond the debates raised by the issues proper to each of the different fields 
concerned by the social re-foundation, transversal cleavages have emerged, which 
involve various, even opposing, ways of conceptualising the workings of French so-
cial democracy. In this light, the contracts primacy (especially in decentralised con-
tracts) can thus easily be demanded by the Medef as this does not threaten the em-
ployers prerogatives. How are we to understand that well-balanced solutions be 
arise even while the unionisation rate does not go above 9% in France as a whole 
(and 5% in the private sector)? Behind the fiction of an autonomous social order 
which triumphs over the political sphere, what we actually see witness is the return 
of employers unilateral power (Supiot 1989). With the demands for contractual 
autonomy and the priority given to firm level bargaining, there is the risk of an em-
ployers self-management shoving unions aside. This weak governance (Lallement 
2000) has threatened to increase further in importance, because the Medef seems to 
be unwilling to amend the very liberal regime of unions representativeness that, 
 
14
 Declaration of CGT-Force Ouvrière during its first employers-unions meeting on February 3
th
,
2000. 
15
 Editorial, FO Hebdo, January 19th, 2000, n° 2461. 
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helped by the unions internal divisions, allowed it to strengthen its position further 
in the bargaining process (Lyon-Caen 2001). 
From this perspective, the common position on the reform of collective bargain-
ing signed in July 2001 by the employers organisations and workers unions (with 
the exception of the CGT) does not dissipate all doubts. Subjected to a word-by-
word discussion for months, the text does bring new elements contributing to a better 
equilibrium in negotiations. At the same time, and this shows the necessity for a 
guarantor in all contractual processes, social partners have asked the State to reform 
the collective bargaining procedural framework so as to increase its efficiency and 
legitimacy, by introducing majority rule for the validation of collective agreements. 
As for the articulation between the laws field of application and collective bargain-
ing, the signatory parties propose to introduce in French law a mechanism similar to 
the EU Treatys articles 137 and 138.  
The declarations text is thus quite different from the initial employers expecta-
tions as it reaffirms the principles of respect for social public order dispositions and 
for the collective agreements classical hierarchy. But the essential procedural guar-
antee mentioned by the declaration is put in the hands of the firms negotiators. Since 
then, especially with the failure of the negotiations on vocational training, Medef has 
interpreted the text as if it gave great autonomy to firms, thus enabling it to distance 
itself from decisions taken at a higher level.  
 Conclusion: on E. Durkheims continued relevancy 
In a union context such as that in France, one is led to question the conse-
quences of contractual autonomy demanded by the proponents of a social partnership 
freed from the State. Historical research on this issue reminds us strongly that con-
tractual autonomy only became a concrete principle when founded upon complex 
mechanisms that combine law and contract. This ensured the participation of labour 
and capital in the development of the collective interest, while counterbalancing the 
relationship of subordination between the actors (Supiot 2001). The contemporary 
debates on the social re-foundation bring us to such a conclusion. Indeed, we have 
to recognise that Medefs reformist ambition goes hand in hand with the production 
of a discourse that, because it is based on the fallacious dichotomy between law and 
contract, is problematic for anyone with knowledge of the issues historical and so-
ciological underpinnings. By referring to a doctrine of subjective rights which con-
siders that situations of right can arise out of a simple agreement of mutual wills, 
outside of any consideration for the social conditions of their implementation (for 
example, inequality or subordination), the Medefs contractual philosophy 
voluntarily repudiates the very logic of labour law.  
It is thus not pure coincidence if, in order to criticise the diminution of the con-
tractual order (Ewald 2000), some analysts deeply involved in the employers con-
federation strategy have called for the re-valorisation of the civil rights contract 
against the employment contract : it implies an independence of the individual, con-
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trary to the de facto inequality of contract signatories in employment relations. The 
same authors invoke L. Bourgeois, L. Duguit and E. Durkheim in order to argue that 
the social re-foundation goes back to the very foundations of the Republic and its 
belief in the virtues of contract. But can one really link this to E. Durkheim and more 
generally to the social solidarity theorists? Indeed, one of E. Durkheims main points 
revolves around the inadequacy of the idea of inter-subjective consent as a basis for 
political justice (Pharo 1999). When E. Durkheim argues in his famous phrase that 
not everything is contractual in a contract, it is after he had understood that, in 
modern societies, it is not enough that the contract be agreed upon, it has to be just 
and the manner by which consent is given then should become an external criterion 
of the contracts level of equity (Durkheim 1995: 231). Doing so, E. Durkheim 
criticises the thesis according to which a contract is a meeting of autonomous wills 
and designates the State as a third party guaranteeing the contracts justice. This ob-
viously undermines any possible link between his thoughts and those of todays so-
cial re-founders. But E. Durkheims contemporary pertinence can also be found in a 
methodological imperative, now more necessary than ever: one should maintain a 
critical distance from the actors discourses who, for multiple strategic reasons, for-
get that their contractual ideology is perhaps nothing more than an old wine that can-
not easily be recycled in the new bottle of French industrial relations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